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President of EcoHealth Alliance 
Human Activity is at the Root of Pandemic 
Diseases 
Pandemics have a long history in our global 
population, from the Justinian Plague of 
AD541-2 through the Black Death of the 
middle ages to the 1918 flu and a series of 
recent infections such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, 
and Ebola. Pandemics are diseases with 
global spread, meaning they typically affect 
more than one continent. Historical reviews 
of the natural history of pandemics suggest 
some common themes: 1) in the majority of 
cases, they are caused by diseases that were 
previously unknown; 2) they often exploit 
new travel and trade networks; and 3) they 
frequently originate in wildlife species in 
remote regions. With the growing interface 
between human populations and wildlife 
species, and increases in globalization and 
air travel, it is likely that pandemic 
incidences will only become more frequent. 
Many pandemics have their roots in 
emerging infectious disease (EID) events. 
These pandemic EIDs are essentially 
diseases on the move, increasing in case 
numbers, expanding their geographical 
footprint, changing their nature to become 
more virulent to people, or making the 
jump from animal hosts to people for the 
first time. The different scales of impact 
can be viewed as representing different 
stages of emergence, often with different 
underlying causal drivers (Fig. 1). For 
example, HIV-1 emerged from 
Chimpanzees in Central Africa in the early 
20th Century when a person was 
contaminated by chimpanzee retrovirus 
(SIVCPZ) probably during hunting or 
butchering of bushmeat. This virus 
replicated in that person and evolved the 
capacity for person-to-person spread so that 
the epidemic smoldered within the human 
population for decades as the virus evolved 
into HIV-1. New patterns of human 
demography and movement in 1950s and 
1960s were then exploited by HIV/AIDS as 
it invaded African cities, then spread 
globally with the rise of international air 
travel in the 1970s-80s. Not all EIDs are 
able to make the transition to pandemic, 
however. Some infect people, but are 
unable to spread from one person to 
another, either never achieving this, or only 
causing small, localized outbreaks. 
Understanding what brings a disease into a 
population and causes it to evolve the ability 
for sustained human-to-human transmission 
can provide a potential policy framework for 
preventing pandemics because intervention 
strategies can be tailored to reduce the threat 
at its origin. However, before we can enact 
policies, we need to understand when and 
where to act and how much they will cost. 
Most pandemics begin with an initial 
‘spillover’ event, when people are infected 
by a disease typically exclusive to an animal 
reservoir (Stage 1). Some spillover events 
die out rapidly when pathogens can’t be 
transmitted among people, but, in other 
cases, pathogens do evolve the capacity for 
human-to-human transmission. These 
emerging pathogens often undergo repeated 
cycles of spillover (Stage 2) followed by 
small-scale spread (green in Fig. 1) and in 
some cases larger outbreaks (orange in Fig. 
1). 
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Fig. 1: The Process of pandemic Emergence and some 
policies and approaches used to counter each stage 
Occasionally, pathogens that are 
transmissible between people enter 
globalized travel and trade networks to 
become pandemic (Stage 3). True 
pandemics are rare events, but extremely 
damaging when measured in morbidity, 
mortality, or economic damages. 
The Increasing Frequency and Cost of 
Pandemics 
Analysis of global databases of EID events 
provides important insights into recent and 
future trends in disease emergence, the 
underlying drivers of emergence, and 
potential strategies for control and 
prevention. Firstly, EIDs are increasing in 
frequency, even after correcting for 
increasing surveillance over time.1  The 
cause of this trend is likely attributed to 
decreasing boundaries between wildlife 
and human populations. Additional and 
related factors include, increasing human 
population density, land use change, 
wildlife trade, and agricultural 
intensification. Secondly, the proportion of 
EID events that become pandemic is likely 
to increase because the number of people 
traveling by air, road and sea is 
exponentially rising. Thirdly, the economic 
impact of emerging diseases is likely to 
increase in the future because trade and 
travel patterns are often disrupted by 
pandemics, causing significant financial 
losses. Finally, statistical analysis of 
correlates of EID origins show that there 
are distinct geographic regions from which 
future EIDs and pandemics will most likely 
originate. These emerging disease hotspots 
tend to be tropical regions rich in wildlife 
biodiversity with large and growing human 
populations (Fig. 2). As human 
populations increase and the human 
footprint expands, bringing us into closer 
contact with wildlife, livestock and each 
other, the incidence of EIDs has also begun 
to increase. 
 
Fig. 2: Global emerging infectious disease hotspots (red) 
are regions that contain the right mixture of dense human 
populations, high wildlife biodiversity, and rapid land use 
change. This map highlights the Southeast Asian region, 
and hotspots include places where SARS emerged 
(Southern China), and Nipah virus continues to spillover 
(Bangladesh, Northern India).2 
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These analyses provide us with a strategic 
framework to develop policies to better 
control pandemics, and to prevent them 
from emerging in the first place. They also 
provide a way to allocate our global 
resources efficiently by targeting regions 
where pandemics are most likely to 
emerge, the people most likely to be the 
patient zero of the next pandemic, and the 
human-wildlife interface from which it is 
most likely to emerge. 
The cost of pandemics is often out of 
proportion to the morbidity and mortality 
rates. In 2002-3, the first pandemic of the 
21st Century began in a small group of 
people trading wildlife in Guangdong 
province, China. SARS eventually spread 
to 37 countries within a few months and 
led to a large impact on international travel 
and trade (between $10 and 50 Billion) 
despite the relatively small number 
infected (8,096 infections and 774 
fatalities).  In West Africa during 2013-15, 
Ebola virus spread from an initial focus in 
Guinea to cause the largest known 
outbreak of this virus, infecting over 
28,000 people and causing mortality in 
more than 11,000. It spread to seven other 
countries, leading to disruption of air 
travel, controversial quarantine measures, 
and social unrest. The estimated cost of the 
outbreak is between $10 and $30 billion. 
Policies to prevent or control pandemics 
earlier in the chain of emergence are likely 
to be substantially cheaper and more cost-
effective than the, often long term, societal 
changes needed to reduce their impact once 
they have spread globally. 
How rapidly should we enact a Global 
Strategy to thwart Pandemics? 
Given the global nature of pandemics, 
could there be a global, coordinated 
strategy to thwart them, and is this 
feasible, possible, or necessary? The 
geographical hotspots of pandemic 
emergence are critical to this challenge. 
Our analysis shows that diseases emerge 
predominantly in tropical, developing 
countries that have significant challenges 
with healthcare and prevention of existing 
diseases. Economic development often 
drives pandemic origins, with pressure to 
alter land use, expand cities, and build road 
networks. These economic actions put 
human populations into closer contact with 
wildlife that harbor novel, potentially 
zoonotic, pathogens. Once an emerging 
disease is able to spread person-to-person, 
it will naturally gravitate to the countries 
which have the highest rates of air travel, 
meaning that EID pandemics will likely 
have a large human and financial impact 
on developed countries as well as 
developing countries. Pandemics should 
thus be viewed as global commons 
problem that intrinsically requires 
international cooperation to solve. 
The rising frequency of emerging diseases is 
critical to considerations of the necessity, 
feasibility and cost of a global pandemic 
strategy. The relative frequency of EID 
events (Stage 1 of pandemic emergence) has 
been measured for the past five decades and 
corrected for underlying reporting biases. 
Based on this data, we can predict that 
around five new EID events will occur each 
year, and about three of these will originate 
in animals.3  Additionally, the rise in EID 
frequency is exponential. This creates an 
interesting economic policy conundrum: As 
the frequency and economic impact of EIDs 
rise, our ability to prevent their initial 
spillover is reduced as it becomes too 
difficult or too costly. 
The dynamics of pandemics can be modeled 
in economic terms to deduce how rapidly an 
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effective global strategy will need to be 
enacted for it to be cost-effective (Fig. 3).  
 
Fig. 3: Framework of an economic model to examine the 
urgency for a globally coordinated policy to reduce the 
increasing frequent origin of new pandemics.4  
Our real options model considers the 
increasing economic cost of pandemics as 
they increase in frequency. Given that 
current policies to control pandemic 
emergence are expensive, it considers a 
policy cost (k) that we will incur as soon as a 
global program is executed. The policies 
reduce damages straight away, but because 
they are costly, it pays to wait until the 
global damages from disease emergence 
exceed this cost before enacting them. This 
value of waiting can be deduced if we 
parameterize the model with data on EID 
event frequency, the cost of pandemics, and 
the cost of global programs to control and 
prevent them. Using this approach, we find 
that there is a relatively short window of 27 
years within which it is optimal to execute a 
global program. However, given that 
national capacity building for the 
International Health Regulations (IHR) – 
which are the closest we have to a global 
policy to reduce pandemic risk - have 
significantly lagged behind national 
commitments, it seems that this waiting time 
window needs to be reduced even further. 
That is, a global policy enacted now would 
likely take a few years to adopt and roll out, 
so that the waiting time is effectively zero. 
Given this urgency, we now examine 
different strategies to thwart pandemics at 
each of the three stages of emergence in 
Figure 1. 
The y-axis represents the net present 
value of the expected damages of an 
EID outbreak plus the cost, k, of a 
policy if implemented. The x-axis 
represents expected damages over 
time. The blue line represents 
expected damages following 
business as usual, and the value of 
waiting is not considered. The green 
line represents the evolution of EID 
damages if a policy with cost, k, is 
implemented. If the value of waiting 
is ignored, D~ is the threshold at 
which a policy should be 
implemented. The red line, known as 
the ‘continuation value’, illustrates 
the expected damages under business 
as usual including the value of 
waiting. The decision model simply 
takes the currently experienced 
damage, a point on the x- axis, and 
determines which of the three lines is 
lowest (has lowest expected present 
damages and costs). For damages 
less than D* it is optimal to 
“continue” to wait. For all damages 
above D* it is optimal to implement 
the policy. D* is the optimal 
threshold. 
Preventing the Spillover of Novel 
Pathogens at Ground Zero (Stage 1 of 
Emergence) 
In order to develop effective pandemic 
prevention policies, the underlying drivers of 
pandemics must be targeted. However, 
reducing the drivers of EIDs and pandemics 
almost invariably means altering industrial, 
trade, agricultural or primary industry 
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activities, or human behavior over a large 
geographic scale. These drivers are often at 
the core of economic development for EID 
hotspot countries. For example, land use 
change is a significant driver of emerging 
disease and pandemic risk, but is central to 
the economic development of some well-
forested tropical countries where EIDs tend 
to emerge. Thus, policies targeted at 
underlying drivers may be costly, politically 
unpopular, or unlikely to be realized. 
Despite these challenges, it may be possible 
to enact policies that reduce pandemic risk 
significantly if they are targeted to very 
specific activities or to very specific 
segments of the population. These may be 
more successful if there is strong political 
will to accomplish the prevention policies, if 
there are alternative profitable activities, or if 
there are clear health benefits to the industry 
or local community. 
There is growing interest in designing new 
approaches to the underlying causes of 
pandemics. Firstly, the One Health 
movement focuses on the interaction 
between human health, livestock health, 
wildlife and environmental health.5 This 
approach has been used in a series of 
emerging disease and pandemic control 
programs because so many emerging 
diseases have animal origins and/or can be 
linked to environmental change. Three 
UN organizations directly involved in 
global efforts to counter emerging diseases 
and pandemics have formed a specific One 
Health collaboration. The Office 
International des Epizooties (OIE) or 
World Organization for Animal Health, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) have signed a One Health tripartite 
agreement that builds capacity globally to 
reduce disease emergence among 
livestock, its spread through trade, and its 
pandemic potential in people.  
Secondly, there is growing involvement of 
international development agencies and 
departments of defense in capacity building 
to prevent pandemics. In particular, 
USAID launched the Emerging Pandemic 
Threats (EPT) program to prevent the 
origin of new, potentially pandemic, 
agents. Additionally, if they do emerge, 
EPT can detect them at the earliest 
opportunity and build capacity for their 
control in developing countries within EID 
hotspot regions.6 This program includes 
predictive modeling to target hazardous 
activities and reduce costs; surveillance of 
wildlife, livestock and people for new 
pathogens of  
pandemic potential; human behavioral 
risk assessment to identify  and target 
mitigation strategies; programs to 
increase inter-agency One Health 
collaboration in developing countries; 
and significant in-country training and 
capacity building (laboratory, 
diagnostics, research, and 
surveillance). Total investment so far in 
this program is over $500 million.  The 
geographic   targeting of this initiative 
means that these investments have led 
to significant returns and proof-of-
concept in pandemic prevention.  This 
includes the discovery of   hundreds of 
novel viral agents in hotspot countries. 
Some of these have been identified as 
causing human infections and 
outbreaks, while others found in 
wildlife have been shown to have the 
potential to infect and cause illness in 
people. 
Thirdly, some programs are beginning to 
tackle the links between certain industries 
and disease emergence directly. The 
IDRAM initiative from Chatham House 
An Economic and Policy Framework for Pandemic Control and Prevention 
 
6 
 
works with extractive industries to reduce 
risk of known and new pathogen 
emergence to their staff and local 
communities as a result   of extractive 
operations.7 The USAID IDEEAL program 
measures the economic damages associated 
with diseases emerging during tropical 
forest land use change, then works with the 
land planners, ecotourism and the intensive 
agricultural industries to simultaneously 
reduce their footprint and the risk of new 
emerging diseases.8  It is often necessary to 
develop approaches that can be seen as a 
benefit to the industry making the change.  
This may   include creating a competitive 
edge with a ‘greener’ image for a company, 
identifying alternative worksites that reduce 
the risk of disease emergence, 
demonstrating improved health for a 
company’s employees, or designing 
strategies that reduce risk to avoid potential 
legislation or liability. The latter may 
become particularly important to drive 
investment in these programs. 
Containing Epidemics at the Site of 
Emergence (Stage 2) 
Emerging diseases that have spilled over 
from wildlife to people often die out after 
small, localized outbreaks. Sometimes 
these diseases can even be disruptive, 
causing localized outbreaks with 
significant mortality. If infected 
individuals travel to dense urban centers 
or across borders, these diseases can 
become far more significant. Ebola is a 
prime example of this. Of around 30 
previously known outbreaks of Ebola 
virus, almost all have been localized to a 
single country, and only seven caused 
more than 100 cases. In December 2013, 
an outbreak of Ebola virus began in 
Guinea, and spread to Liberia and Sierra 
Leone through their porous borders. By 
May 2014 Ebola had begun to infect 
people in the urban center of Conakry, 
leading to the most significant outbreak 
so far known. Thus, rapid detection and 
control of small localized outbreaks is 
critical to preventing a widespread 
epidemic with the potential to evolve into 
a pandemic. 
The policy measures to prevent epidemics 
from making the jump to pandemics, must 
involve enhancing local in-country 
capacity to detect, diagnose, and control 
outbreaks. There are many ways to do 
this, from academic exchange among 
countries to non-governmental 
organization (NGO) activities. However, 
the success of these efforts depends on the 
vagaries of governance structures and 
capacity at the sites where the EID first 
emerges. The recently launched Global 
Health Security Agenda aims to counter 
this problem by specifically identifying 
and assisting countries most in need of 
capacity building to combat the threat of 
pandemics.9 
Controlling Pandemics across 
Multinational Boundaries (Stage 3) 
In the final stage of the spillover- epidemic-
pandemic continuum (Fig. 1), novel 
pathogens have acquired the ability to spread 
across international boundaries and achieve 
true pandemic status. Once pathogens are in 
the network of air travel and global trade, 
spread can be extremely rapid. The 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, which originated in 
Mexico, had spread as far as New Zealand 
within 8 weeks of the presumed origin and 
the virus had infected between 43 and 89 
million people within 12 months.10 Some 
diseases are capable of global spread even 
without the capacity for human-to-human 
transmission, such as West Nile virus, which 
is carried by mosquitoes and could be easily 
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transported within passenger and cargo 
flights. 
Is there a global policy framework once 
diseases have reached a pandemic level of 
spread? At this point, containment is often 
the top priority during a disease outbreak. 
Policies to achieve this include quarantine, 
flight restrictions, and the rapid deployment 
of drugs and vaccines. Each of these policies 
is costly. The price tag of the West African 
Ebola outbreak control has not been 
accurately calculated yet, but is likely to be 
between $10 and 30 billion.11 Similarly, the 
global outbreak of SARS in 2003 caused 
only 8,096 cases and 774 deaths – orders of 
magnitude lower than the West African 
Ebola outbreak or typical seasonal flu 
outbreaks. Yet the cost of SARS is 
staggering – between $10 and 50 billion. 
How much will Pandemic Prevention 
and Control Cost? 
Policies for dealing with problems of the 
global commons are expensive and difficult 
to enact. For pandemics, our real options 
model (Fig. 3) provides a framework to 
estimate cost and assess which strategies are 
most cost effective. To do this, we set a goal 
of reducing the continued rise in the 
frequency of pandemics by 50%. We 
considered two approaches based on climate 
change scenario modeling: 1) Adaptation to 
the annual rise in pandemic frequency, with 
the model parameterized with data from 
programs that control pandemics (phase 3 in 
Fig. 1), e.g. vaccination strategies, outbreak 
control; and 2) Mitigation of the underlying 
causes of pandemics (Phase 1 in Fig. 1), 
parameterized with data from programs that 
address EID drivers (e.g. the 
FAO/OIE/WHO One Health framework). In 
this approach, the rise in pandemics mirrors 
the rise in C02, such that we have a choice 
of continuing business-as-usual and 
adapting to growing pandemic emergence 
by relying solely on vaccines and outbreak 
control; or mitigating the underlying drivers 
to reduce the number of novel pathogens 
emerging at ground zero. Our model 
demonstrates that, in the long term, 
mitigation programs are more cost- effective 
than business-as-usual, saving between 
$344.0.7 billion and $360.3 billion over the 
next 100 years if implemented today.12 
Secondly, we can use our optimal cost- 
benefit analysis to estimate the global cost of 
reducing the number of new pandemics 
emerging each year by 50%. This is an 
expensive policy involving a one-time cost 
of approximately $343.7 billion. This 
hypothetical approach can then be measured 
against current efforts to reduce pandemic 
threats and against the economic damages 
from pandemics. The U.S. government 
response to the 2013-15 West African Ebola 
outbreak included an appropriation of $5.4 
billion for agencies to control the outbreak, 
treat patients and reduce the threat of future 
emergence of Ebola. While this was a large 
scale outbreak, it is only one pathogen 
emerging once. With over 350 EID events 
since 1960, and estimates of continued 
exponential growth in the annual number of 
EID events, the likelihood of sustaining 
significant costs under business-as-usual is 
high. Considering the high costs of recent 
pandemics (H1N1, SARS, Ebola and 
projections of H5N1 costs), a significant 
investment in pandemic prevention could 
become politically palatable as well as 
demonstrably cost-effective if we wait for 
the next few large scale EID events. 
Finally, in light of the growing threat of 
pandemics, the growing capacity of 
emerging diseases to spread with increasing 
population density, and the increasing 
economic impact of pandemics, the need to 
An Economic and Policy Framework for Pandemic Control and Prevention 
 
8 
 
act is urgent. Pandemics should be 
considered objectively as a cost of doing 
globalized business on the planet – travel, 
trade, economic development. We need to 
insure against them.  We need to treat them 
as a development and security issue, not 
just a health issue, and we need to work 
seamlessly across disciplines to prevent, 
control and combat them. If we are 
currently living in the age of pandemics, 
the next few decades give us a stark 
economic and policy choice – act now, or 
pay a significantly higher price later. 
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of the Nation, Morning Edition, and Fresh Air with Terry Gross. 
 
 
 
 
 
An Economic and Policy Framework for Pandemic Control and Prevention 
 
11 
 
 
The Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Mark Welsh, Dean and Holder of the Edward & Howard Kruse Endowed Chair 
Founded in 1997, the Bush School of Government and Public Service has become one of the leading public 
and international affairs graduate schools in the nation. One of ten schools and colleges at Texas A&M 
University, a tier-one research university, the School offers master’s level education for students aspiring 
to careers in public service.  
The School is ranked in the top 12 percent of graduate public affairs schools in the nation, according to 
rankings published in U.S. News & World Report. The School now ranks thirty-third among both public 
and private public affairs graduate programs and twenty-first among public universities.  
The School’s philosophy is based on the belief of its founder, George H.W. Bush, that public service is a 
noble calling—a belief that continues to shape all aspects of the curriculum, research, and student 
experience. In addition to the Master of Public Service and Administration degree and the Master of 
International Affairs degree, the School has an expanding online and extended education program that 
includes Certificates in Advanced International Affairs, Homeland Security, and Nonprofit Management. 
Located in College Station, Texas, the School’s programs are housed in the Robert H. and Judy Ley Allen 
Building, which is part of the George Bush Presidential Library Center on the West Campus of Texas A&M. 
This location affords students access to the archival holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum, invitation to numerous events hosted by the George Bush Foundation at the Annenberg 
Presidential Conference Center, and inclusion in the many activities of the Texas A&M community. 
The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs 
Andrew S. Natsios, Director and E. Richard Schendel Distinguished Professor of the Practice 
The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is a research institute housed in the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. The Institute is named in honor of Lt. Gen. 
Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), whose long and distinguished career in public service included serving as 
National Security Advisor for Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. The Institute's core mission 
is to foster and disseminate policy-oriented research on international affairs by supporting faculty and 
student research, hosting international speakers and major scholarly conferences, and providing grants to 
outside researchers to use the holdings of the Bush Library.  
"We live in an era of tremendous global change. Policy makers will confront unfamiliar challenges, new 
opportunities, and difficult choices in the years ahead. I look forward to the Scowcroft Institute supporting 
policy-relevant research that will contribute to our understanding of these changes, illuminating their 
implications for our national interest, and fostering lively exchanges about how the United States can help 
shape a world that best serves our interests and reflects our values."  
 
— Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.) 
